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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KEN THURSTON, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
CACHE COUNTY, et al. 
Defendant and 
Respondent 
MICHAEL P. NIELSEN 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
CACHE COUNTY, et al. 
Defendant and 
Respondent 
Civil No. 16544 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
These actions, consolidated by the Court because of the 
similarity of the facts and law and a common Defendant, were 
brought by the Plaintiffs/Appellants in February of 1979. 
Plaintiffs' requests for Conditional Use Permits to build 
homes on one-acre and five-acre parcels had been denied by 
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County. · The Complaints asked for Mandamus and Declaratory 
. 
Relief against the Defendant County, alleging Defendant's 
applicable ordinances were invalid and the Plaintiffs were 
denied permits because they were not primary-occupation 
farmers or related to farmers. The Defendant answered in 
both actions denying, generally, the allegations of Plain-
tiffs' Complaints and affirmatively alleging that the acts 
of the Defendants were discretionary and in compliance with 
valid County Ordinances. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Trial Court, the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen, 
District Judge, presiding, heard the Plaintiffs' cases on the 
7th day of March, 1979. Both sides presented evidence by 
testimony and documentation, and submitted the case to the 
Court by written argument and memoranda of law. 
The Court issued a Memorandum Decision on the 28th day 
of March 1979 denying any relief to Plaintiffs, primarily 
on the basis that the Court would not substitute its judg-
ment for that of the County Commissioners and on the further 
ground that discrimination in favor of farmers was permissi-
ble and not unconstitutional. 
Thereafter, counsel for Defendant submitted Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Objections to those Findings 
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and Conclusions were timely file~ by Plaintiffs. On May 21. 
1979, the Court issued 'a Memorandum 'Decision denying Plain-
tiffs' Objections to the Findings on the Grounds that the 
Findings had never been presented to the Court. On June 26, 
1979, the Court reviewed the Findi~gs of Fact and found no 
reason to make any changes. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants request that the Court reverse the Decision 
of the lower court and that the relief prayed for by Appel-
lants be granted or that the matter be remanded for further 
proceedings, including a decision on Appellants' Request 
for Declaratory Relief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prior to July 1, 1978, Chapter 13 of the Cache County 
Zoning Ordinance, relative to agricultural zones, provided 
that all parcels would be either A-10 or A-20. This meant 
that in those areas respective parcels could not be subdivi-
ded under 10 acres or 20 acres respectively without a rezone 
or variance (EX. 1) Under the old ordinance, a secondary 
dwelling on a 10-acre or 20-acre parcel was subject to issu-
ance of a Conditional Use Permit. 
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Effective July l, 1978, the agricultural zone ordinance 
was chan~ed such that no Cdnditional Us~ Permit was required 
for persons engaged in agricultural pursuits as a primary 
occupation. Such persons no longer needed a Conditional Use 
Permit, but they or members of their family or their hired 
help could get a building permit as a matter of course on any 
half-acre parcel in the agricultural zone. All others, who 
were not farm related, were required to get a Conditional 
Use Permit to put up any dwelling in an agricultural zone. 
A point system was inaugurated and a general understanding 
existed that a person would need 650 points in order to get a 
Conditional Use Per~it. (EX. 3a - 3b) However, in practice, 
the point system was only a guideline and some persons were 
given Conditional Use Permits though they were below the 650 
points and others were denied permils when they had or should 
have had more than 650 points. 
Under those circumstances, Plaintiffs Thurston and Nielsen 
applied for Conditional Use Permits in an agricultural zone. 
The facts, as they relate to Thurston and Nielsen, are here-
after separately stated. 
THURSTON: 
In November of 1978, Plaintiff Thurston attempted to 
get a Conditional Use Permit to permit him to build on a 
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one-acre parcel in an agricultur~l zone fronting on a county 
. 
road in Cache County. '(TR 18- 19) · His application was 
denied and he appealed the decision of the Planning and 
Zoning Board to the County Commissioners. (TR 20 - 21) The 
Planning and Zoning Board was uphe~d by the County Commission-
ers by an oral statement. Nothing in writing was given to 
Plaintiff Thurston. (TR 21) At the trial, it appeared that 
one of the reasons Thurston's application was turned down 
was that he was a builder rather than building a home for 
himself. (TR 26 - 27) Ultimately he was never given any 
reason in writing for the County's decision. (TR 33) 
At the trial, Don Williams, a member of the Planning and 
Zoning Commission of the Defendant County, testified that the 
Commission turned down the application for a Conditional Use 
Permit because of objections by adjoining property owners 
(TR 38 - 39) and because it did not meet the "point system". 
At the meeting, Mr. Williams stated ••••• "if we allow this 
request, with it not meeting the point system, then we have 
no way to stop further growth". (TR 39) (EX. 7) 
Mr. Williams also admitted that a Paul J. Wheeler was 
granted a building permit on a single acre of ground just two 
blocks away from the Thurston property. The Minutes (EX. 8) 
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quote H~. Williams as follows: "Don stated that he is fami-
liar with this site and the ground i's ofl no farm value." 
(TR 42) Mr. Williams admitted that the two parcels both had 
about 500 points on the point system and the only difference 
is that Mr. Thurston's property had a little grass on it. 
(TR 43) Mr. Williams also admitted that Mr. Call, the land 
owner adjacent to Mr. Thurston's property had removed the 
top soil from the Thurston property to build the home next 
door. (TR 44) Mr. Williams also admitted that the Wheeler 
property was actually classified as "prime", the same as 
Thurston's. (TR 45) The fact that Wheeler was going to live 
in the house rather than build it for someone else was a fac-
tor in making the decision, according to Mr. Williams (TR 45) 
NIELSEN: 
Plaintiff Nielsen requested permission to divide ten (10) 
acres he owned into two five-acre parcels for building lots. 
The property was zoned agricultural. His application was 
turned down by the Planning Commission and the Commission was 
subsequently affirmed on appeal by the County Commission. 
The Planning Commission turned down the application on the 
primary ground that the request did not meet the point system 
due to the fact that it did not front on a county road. The 
land was agriculturally marginal. (TR 49 - 51) 
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FACTS APPLYING TO BOTH THURSTON AND NIELSEN: 
. 
A summary of the iestimony of the witnesses follows. 
establishing facts undisputed which apply to both Plaintiffs' 
positions. 
Don Williams: 
Mr. Williams established that whether or not property was 
classified prime was of no real importance since, as a matter 
of their own judgment, whether or not the members of the Plan-
ning and Zoning Commission had looked at the property, they 
could re-classify it any way they wanted. For example, with 
reference to the Shaw property, classified on the soil maps as 
"prime", at (TR 58) the following appears: "Bruce stated that 
there was a question on the soil, whether it was prime or not. 
The county map shows it as prime •••••• Ray made the motion with 
Aaron seconding that, in considering the soil type, they desig-
nate it as non-prime and that it would meet the point system; 
we approved the application". The following question was then 
asked of Mr. Williams: "So, although the property was shown 
on the application as prime, the motion was made to change it 
to non-prime so that it would meet the point system at that 
time; is that correct?" Answer: "It looks like it." (TR 59) 
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Donald Drage: 
Mr. Drage testified that the Thutstop lot was not classi-
fied as prime land according to the county soil survey (TR 65) 
and that he sent a letter to the Planning Commission pointing 
this out and contending that the 200 point deduction should 
not have been considered. (TR 67) 
Kenneth Sizemore: 
Kenneth Sizemore, an employee of the Planning Commission, 
testified that the Planning Office issues_building permits 
without ·a Conditional Use Permit when the applicant states 
that be is an employee or a member of the family of an owner 
whose primary occupation is farming. No check is made as to 
whether or not that assertion is true except in checking the 
name on the deed to the property. The property need not be 
any particular size and it makes no difference whether the 
building permit is issued on a small parcel to the son of a 
farmer even though the father's farm may be miles away. 
(TR 79 - 80) 
Hr. Sizemore further testified that it was possible to 
get a permit in an agricultural zone without the Conditional 
Use Permit by simply showing that there was an earnest money 
agreement in existence for the purchase of the property prior 
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to July 6, 1978, when the new po~nt system and zoning law 
I 
went into effect. In at least three instances, building per-
mits were issued without a Conditional Use Permit when earnest 
money agreements were produced dated June 30, 1978. (TR 81 -
84) In connection to issuing perm~ts to farm-related perso•s 
without a Conditional Use Permit, Sizemore was asked the 
question: "What do you do to determine whether or not a per-
son is engaged as a primary occupation in dairying or farains 
in connection with these applications?" Answer: •we ask the 
person when they come for the permit." Question: •You just 
take their word for it?" Answer: "Yes, sir." (TR 91) 
Mr. Sizemore testified also that there is no restriction on 
a farm-related person who gets a secondary dwelling permit 
without a Conditional Use Permit against them selling to a 
third-party stranger at any time. (TR 94) 
Gaylene Carson: 
Gaylene Carson, an employee of the Planning and Zoning 
Board, testified that both Thurston and Nielsen were turned 
down simply because they did not have enough points under the 
point system. (TR 129 - 130) 
Darrell Kunzler: 
Mr. Kunzler testified that he sold a four-acre parcel to 
Michael Call who subsequently sold the one acre to Mr. Thurston 
(TR 143 -146) He then appeared and objected to Mr. Thurston's 
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application for ~ Conditional Use Permit on the ground that he 
. 
sold four acres to Call for'$2,000.00 an·acre and Call had oral-
ly promised not to sell any part of the land. (TR 155) Kunzler 
did not object to the Wheeler application, also adjacent to 
his property, because Wheeler worked for him. (TR 156) 
Joseph Cowley: 
Hr. Cowley, a neighbor, testified that he objected to 
the Thurston application primarily on the ground that he was 
fearful about how people would feel about such things as the 
smell of manure and his bulls. (TR 170 - 171) 
Hr. Leishman: 
Hr. Leishman, a member of the Planning Commission, testi-
fied that the Ordinances permitting farmers to get building 
permits on agricultural land without Conditional Use Permits 
were passed pursuant to a questionnaire that went out to the 
entire county. He testified that all of the residents wanted 
Cache Valley to remain primarily as an agricultural valley 
(TR 202 - 203) However, it was established that the question-
naire only received 80 responses. (TR 205) (EX. 24) 
Commissioner Theurer: 
Commissioner Theurer testified that one of the reasons 
why the Thurston permit was denied and the Whee10r permit 
granted was that people complained about Thurston's permit 
and the only other reason for denial were the reasons given 
10 
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in Mr. McKell's letter. (TR 214) 
Commissioner Chambers: 
Commissioner Chambers testified that, "those who are 
related to agriculture have had t~eirs (permits) approved and 
those who have not been related to agriculture, I think, have 
not had theirs approved, generally speaking." (TR 228) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I 
THE DENIAL OF PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATIONS FOR CONDI-
TIONAL USE PERMITS WAS ARBITRARY, DISCRIMINATORY, 
UNREASONABLE, AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
II 
THE APPLICABLE COUNTY ORDINANCES, EVEN IF VALID, 
ARE ADMINISTERED IN AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL MANNER. 
III 
THE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS VIOLATED THEIR OWN PRO-
CEDURAL RULES BY NOT SUPPLYING EITHER PLAINTIFF 
WITH WRITTEN NOTIFICATION OF THEIR DECISION, 
GIVING REASONS THEREFOR. 
IV 
PURSUANT TO DEFENDANT'S ORDINANCES, A ONE-HALF 
ACRE LOT IN AN AGRICULTURAL ZONE IS UNRESTRICTED. 
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v 
THE APPLICABLE COUNTY ORDINANCES ARE CONTRARY TO 
THE STATE ENABLING ACT. 
VI 
BOTH DEFENDANT AND THE TRIAL COURT TACITLY ADMITTED 
DISCRIMINATION EXISTED AND ATTEMPTED TO JUSTIFY OR 
RATIONALIZE THE DISCRIMINATION. 
VII 
THE COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING PLAINTIFFS' OBJEC-
TIONS TO FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
VIII 
CONCLUSION 
12 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE DENIAL OF PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATIONS FOR CONDI-
TIONAL USE PERMITS WAS ARBITRARY, DISCRIMINATORY, 
UNREASONABLE, AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
The Planning and Zoning Board and the Commission both 
stated as primary reasons for the denial of the Thruston 
permit the opposition of neighbors in the vicinity. However, 
the opposition was not supported by any factual data upon 
which the Planning and Zoning Board and County Commission 
could validly base a denial of the permit. 
"Public notice of a hearing of an application for an 
exception to the zoning laws is not given for the purpose of 
polling the neighborhood on the question involved, but to 
give interested persons an opportunity to present facts from 
which the Board may determine whether the particular provi-
sion of the ordinance as applied to the applicant's property 
is reasonably necessary for the protection of public health. 
The Board should base their determination upon facts which 
they find to have been established, instead of upon the 
wishes of persons who appear for or against the granting of 
the application." Sundland vs Zoning Board 50 RI 108, 145a 
451 (1929) Anderson American Law of Zoning §19.27. 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A use which is permitted by the zoning ordinance may 
not be denied on the ground that there is, community pres-
sure against allowing additional uses of the kind proposed. 
Fox vs. Buffalo Zoning Board, 401 NYS 2d 649 (1978) 
As to Plaintiff Nielsen's property, it was down-graded 
on the point system because it did not abut on a county road. 
It was established, however, that a right of way existed from 
the county road which would not be a maintenance problem to 
the County. 
The standards by which the Planning Commission, as the 
delegated authority, is permitted to grant or deny special 
permits are far too vague. The Planning Commission has 
almost unlimited discretion to approve or deny special 
permits whether or not they qualify under the point system 
which, in itself, is a very sparse standard. 
Where a zoning ordinances permits officials to grant 
or refuse permits without the guidance of any standard but 
merely according to their own ideas, it does not afford 
equal protection of the law. Osius vs. St. Clair Shores, 
344 MICH. 693, 75 NW 2d 25 (1956) 
Standards are generally enumerated in the municipal 
ordinance in order to control the discretion of zoning 
boards of appeals and to provide the judiciary with an ade-
quate basis for judicial review of any board decision. 
In the absence of such standards, the court will invalidate 
the ordinance. Rohan, Zoning and Land Use controls §44.02(1) 
14 
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The Defendant County Commissioners have reserved to 
themselves as a legislative bod~ the final power to grant or 
deny special permits in Cache County, Assuming an appropri-
ate enabling statute, the legislative authority may specifi-
cally retain authority to issue permits by spelling out such 
reservations in the zoning ordina~ces. When permit-issuing 
authority is retained by the legislative body, the granting 
or denying of special permits by that body is regarded by 
the courts as an administrative rather than a legislative 
function. When the legislative body is acting in an 
administrative capacity, it must follow the zoning regula-
tions and its actions are reviewable and subject to judicial 
reversal if they are without support in the record or are 
otherwise arbitrary or unreasonable. Golden vs. St. Louis 
Park, 266 MINN. 46, 122 NW 2d 570 (1963) Anderson, American 
Law of Zoning, §19.10. 
The County's explanation of the point system (EX. 18) 
states: "While it is generally recommended that 650 points 
are needed for approval, a use which can earn 650 points is 
not automatically approved, although it may be looked on more 
favorably than a use which earns less than 650 points." In 
practical usage, however, the point system means almost 
nothing other than its use as an excuse for arbitrary action 
for other reasons. It was clearly established at the trial 
that a farm oriented application for a Conditional Use Permit 
with less than 650 points would be approved, while a non-farm 
oriented application would be disapproved, 
15 
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The power to grant or withhold special permits must be 
limited by standards sufficjent to conta~n the discretion of 
the board of adjustments or other reviewing board and provide 
the court with a reasonable basis for judicial review of 
board decisions. Tandem Holding Corp. vs. Board of Zoning 
Appeals, 43 NY 2d 801, 373 NE 2d 282 (1977) 
The only rational standard the Defendant County imposed 
was the point system and they compromised even that standard 
by considering it only a general guideline which they could 
ignore for reasons of their own. Thurston showed that his 
land was not prime and that he therefore exceeded the required 
650 points. Nothing was introduced by the Defendant to show 
that Mr. Don Drage's letter was in error. Therefore, Thurs-
ton was entitled as a matter of right to his Conditional Use 
Permit. "Where an applicant for a special permit has met all 
of the standards imposed by the ordinance for such issuance, 
it is the duty of the issuing authority to approve the permit." 
Pleasant Valley Home Construction vs. Van Wagner, 53 AD 2d 
863, 385 NYS 2d 253 (1976). 
It was established at the trial that persons not related 
to or working for a primary-occupation farmer or dairyman were 
discriminated against in that they must get a Conditional Use 
Permit whereas a farmer need not. It is submitted that these 
provisions are invalid as being unconstitutional in that they 
deny equal protection of the law. State law requires that 
16 
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zoning regulations shall be uniform. UCA §17-27-11. This has 
been held to mean that'the delegation of power to grant a 
special permit must apply a single rule equally to all property 
and all property owners in the district to which it applies. 
Anderson, American Law of Zoning, § 19.05 
In the application of equal protection, it has gener-
ally been held that the restrictions or standards must apply 
to the land itself and not the person nor the business of 
the person who owns or occupies it. · Olevson vs. Zoning Board 
7l'RI 303, 44A 2d 720 (1945) 
Most ordinances today provide adequate and substantial 
standards to guide the board's discretion in issuing or deny-
ing special permits. The uniformity requirement, therefore, 
appears to be satisfied if the delegation of authority to 
issue special permits applies equally to all land owners in 
the same zone. Rohan, Zoning and Land Use Controls §44.01(4) 
On its face, then, the Cache County Ordinance is 
invalid inasmuch as it provides that a primary-occupation 
farmer or his family and employees may obtain building 
permits for residences on his agricultural property whereas 
others may not. Thus, concievably, a farmer could get 15 - 20 
building permits for residences on his farm property or for 
his family on lots even far from his farm property. Others 
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who own land in an agricultural zone, regardless of the 
size, who are engaged in anQther primary· business or occupa-
tion, could get no such permit. 
The Courts have repeatedly said that the board should be 
interested only in the land in question and not the person 
who occupies it. To deny a special use or conditional use 
permit because of the occupation or the non-rural tendencies 
of the person who owns the land is a denial of equal protec-
tion. Beckish vs. Planning and Zoning, 162 CONN. 11, 291 A 
2d 208 (1971) Hickerson vs. Flannery, 42 TENN. APP. 329, 302 
sw 2d 508 (1956) 
The zoning ordinance clearly permits primary=occupation 
farmers to build one-family dwellings without number provided 
they are for family members of employees, on their property 
on one-half acre parcels. The ordinance also states that 
others must get a conditional use permit. Thus, if the ordi-
nance is interpreted not to discriminate against persons 
because of their occupation, then it is ambiguous. "If a 
zoning ordinance is ambiguous, one section permitting a pro-
posed use anrl another section prohibiting such use without 
a special permit, the ordinance will be strictly construed in 
favor of the landowner. Henderson vs. Zoning Appeals Board, 
328 SO. 2d. 175 (1975, LA APP) 331 SO. 2d, 474. 
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II 
THE APPLICABLE COUNTY ORDINANC'ES, EVEN IF VALID, 
ARE ADMINISTERED IN AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL MANNER. 
Even if the County Ordinances enacted to become effec-
tive in July, 1978, are constitutional, they are, neverthe-
less, administered in an unconstitutional manner. Defendants 
and their employees seem to disregard the point system which 
is really the only objective standard Defendants could fol-
low in granting or denying building permits in agricultural 
zdnes. Planning Commission employees are not determining 
definitely that family members and employees of land owners 
who may get building permits are related to a primary-occupa-
tion farmer or dairyman. No check is made of that assertion 
even though many of the permits are issued on very small par-
cels. The conduct of the Defendant in granting or denying 
permits does not comply with their policy plan. (EX. 2) 
This plan clearly states, as to agricultural land use, that 
the purpose of the Commissioners is to promote an agricultural 
industry that efficiently produces and markets high quality 
food and fibre; is profitable to farm operators; and contri-
butes a high income flow to the local economy. It has no-
where been shown by the County that denying permits on small 
non-economic agriculturally zoned parcels could possibly ac-
complish that objective. 
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The Constitution not only forbids discriminatory laws 
making distinction without a rational ~asis, but it also 
. 
forbids the discriminatory enforcement of nondiscriminatory 
laws. People vs. Utica Drug Co. 225 NYS 2d 128; 4 ALR 3d 
393 
III 
THE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS VIOLATED THEIR OWN PRO-
CEDURAL RULES BY NOT SUPPLYING EITHER PLAINTIFF 
WITH WRITTEN NOTIFICATION OF THEIR DECISION 
GIVING REASONS THEREFOR. 
§7-2(6) of the County Ordinance (EX. l) provides that, in 
connection with appeals to the Commission from decisions of 
the Planning and Zoning commission, the Board of Commissioners 
may affirm, modify, or reverse the decision of the Planning 
Commission. However, the Board of Commissioners shall pre-
sent, in writing, the reasons for its action. In the case of 
Plaintiff Thurston, no written decision at all was ever given 
to him. In the case of Plaintiff Nielsen, a written decision 
was given to him, but no reasons therefor were given. Fur-
ther, at the Planning and Zoning meeting, Nielsen was asked 
why he even hothered to come. An unidentified member of the 
Commission stated: "All you've ~ot to do is say you're a 
farmer". (TR 113) 
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IV 
PURSUANT TO DEFENDANT'S ORDINAN~ES, A ONE-HALF 
ACRE LOT IN AN AGRICULTURAL ZONE IS UNRESTRICTED. 
Exhibit 19 (Defendant's explanation of the effects of the 
new agricultural zone) clearly states that "all existing land 
parcels, except for restricted loti, will still be eligible 
for one building permit for a single dwelling after the amend-
ment is adopted". §1-6 (79) of the County Ordinance defines 
a restricted lot as "a parcel of land severed or placed in a 
separate ownership after August 20, 1970, and which does not 
meet all area, width, yard, and other requirements of this 
ordinance for a lot •••. " It is significant that the defini-
tion of a restricted lot was not changed, although the area 
requirement for lots was changed to one-half (1/2) acre from 
ten (10) acres or twenty (20) acres. Thus it is submitted 
that, since a restricted lot has to be one which was severed 
after August 20, 1970, and which does not meet area require-
ments, that any lot whether or not severed after August 20, 
1970, is not a restricted lot if it is one-half acre or larger. 
(County Ordinance §13-5) 
It follows that since the point system and the conditional 
use requirement applies only to restricted lots that, as a mat-
ter of logic, the County Ordinances cannot apply to lots one-
half acre or more in an agricultural zone. 
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v 
THE APPLICABLE COUNTY ORDINANCES ARE CONTRARY 
TO THE STATE ENABLING ACT. 
Any power the Defendant Commission has to enact zoning 
ordinances and issue special permits is granted by enabling 
legislation in the Utah Code §17-27-1 et. seq. A careful 
analysis of the enabling legislation does not reveal any 
authority of the County Commission to reserve to itself the 
power to issue or deny special permits. On the contrary, the 
County Commissioners are mandated to create a Board of Adjust-
ment. The Board of Adjustment by state law is to handle all 
"appeals •••• taken by any person agrieved by his inability to 
obtain a building permit or by the decision of any adminis-
trative officer or agency based upon or made in the course of 
the administration or enforcement of the provisions of the 
zoning resolution". UCA §17-27-15; §17-27-16. 
"The customary method of providing for the issuance of 
special permits is for the legislative authority of a munici-
pality to delegate issuing power to a Board of Adjustment 
subject to standards srelled out in the regulations. Where 
such a delegation of power is made, the legislative author-
ity is without power to issue special permits. Depue vs. 
Clinton, 160 NW 2d, 860 (1968). 
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"In the absence of some provision in the enabling sta-
tutes for the issuance of permit~ by the legislative body, 
' 
or some specific retention of this power in the zoning ordi-
nance, a municipal legislative authority is without power to 
grant special permits. Anderson, American Law of Zoning, 
§19.10. Section 7-2 of the County ·Zoning Ordinance specifi-
cally bypasses the Board of Adjustment on appeals from the 
Planning Commission on the issuance or denial of the special 
permit. The Commissioners have reserved to th~mselves this 
power. There is a serious question as to whether it is per-
mitted by the state enabling legislation. 
VI 
BOTH DEFENDANT AND THE TRIAL COURT TACITLY ADMITTED 
DISCRIMINATION EXISTED AND ATTEMPTED TO JUSTIFY OR 
RATIONALIZE THE DISCRIMINATION. 
In Finding of Fact Number 9, the Court found that the 
evidence introduced "shows no discrimination against the 
Plaintiff on an intentional basis .••. " 
In Defendant's Answer to Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum 
filed subsequent to the trial, Defendant's counsel stated on 
page 2 thereof that, even though the Wheeler and the Thurston 
properties were both classified as prime, the Wheeler land was 
apparently not of the same quality and, therefore, Wheeler 
was granted the permit and Thurston was not. No evidence 
supports such a conclusions. 
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In the Court's Memorandum Decision dated the 28th of 
March, 1979, the Court tacitly admitted that there was dis-
crimination but attempted to justify or rationalize it the 
discrimination by stating that "both Plaintiffs were pro-
vided hearings and the opportunity to appear and present 
their views •••• " The granting of procedural due process has 
no bearing upon whether or not Plaintiffs were discriminated 
against on the basis of substantive due process. The Court 
went on to say that "no situations .:ere presented showing 
that Defendant discriminated against either Plaintiff on an 
intentional basis". It is submitted that whether or not 
discrimination is intentional is immaterial. 
As to the obvious advantage of farmers under the present 
County Ordinance, the Court attempted to justify by pointing 
out that farmers do not pay gas tax for off road gasoline. 
The primary reason for that being a bad analogy is that 
farmers do not pay gas tax for off-road gasoline because 
they don't use the roads and the gas tax is for road build-
ing and maintenance. The classification is off-road vehicles, 
not occupation. The Court concludes in its opinion that pre-
ference on the use of agricultural land is given to anyone 
who desires to use the land for agricultural purposes and 
for no other reason. It ts submit! ed that this is not the 
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case. The evidence clearly establishes that one had to be 
related to or work fo~ a Primarj-occupation farmer or dairy-
man. One otherwise employed could own a thousand acres of 
land and, if someor.e else was operating it for him, the 
owner's children and employees would not be entitled to 
permits under the present County Ordinances without condi-
tional use approval. 
In a rather cUrious "confession and avoidance argument", 
Defendant, in its trial brief, substantially admitted that 
Defendants have discriminated and have denied equal protec-
tion of the law. They attempt to avoid the impact by arguing 
that discrimination exists in other areas of life. Defendant 
then argued, in effect, that residents of Cache County could 
avoid the discrimination by becoming full time farmers 
themselves. That same specious argument could apply to any 
discrimination and the constitutional requirements of equal 
protection would be annulled if one were to assume that any 
citizen could avoid discrimination by leaving the class 
being discriminated against. 
VII 
THE COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING PLAINTIFFS' OBJEC-
TIONS TO FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
The Plaintiffs filed, on April 25, 1979, Objections to 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Specifically, Find-
ing Number 4 was objected to on the ground that it assumed 
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the validity of the County Ordinances and assu~ed also that 
the County Policy Plan esta~lished the goals recited in the 
Findings. The uncontradicted evidence was to the contrary. 
The Ordinance, on its face, permits discrimination in favor 
of primary-occupation farmers and farm oriented persons as 
does the testimony of the County Commissioners. 
It was also established without contradiction that one 
who had insufficient points but who was, nevertheless, "farm-
oriented" would be granted a Conditional Use Permit. Plain-
tiffs also asked that Findings Number 7 and Number 8 be 
amended on the ground that Plaintiffs' applications were 
not denied for the reasons stated. No adequate reasons for 
the denials were given nor was any reason given by the Defen-
dant Commission in writing. 
It is further submitted that the other objections men-
tioned in Plaintiffs' filed objections are valid and that 
the Findings should have been amended and supplemented ac-
cordingly. 
VIII 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the only reason of any substance 
for the denial of the Thurston permit was objections by neigh-
bors and the fact that Mr. Thurston wa 1 not "farm-oriented". 
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It is submitted that these reasons are not constitutionally 
. 
valid. Further, the opposition voiced by Thurston's "neigh-
bors" was not supported by any factual data upon which the 
Planning and Zoning Board could validly base a denial of a 
Conditional Use Permit. 
One objection to an ordinance which delegates a broad 
special permit authoirty is that it opens the door to dis-
crimination not based upon valid differences. Smith vs. 
Board of Appeal, 319 MASS. 341, 65 NE 2d 547 (1946) 
The standards under which the County Defendant operates 
are far too vague and far too flexible to provide substantive 
or procedural due process. The County has almost unlimited 
discretion to approve or deny Conditional Use Permits since 
they can pay heed to or disregard their own standards which 
consist primarily of the point system. It is therefore 
respectfully submitted that the Judgment should be reversed 
and the relief prayed for by Appellants be granted. 
DATED this 31st day of August, 1979. 
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Barrett & Mathews 
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